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A troubled relationship:  corruption and reform of the public sector in 
development. 
 
Vincent G. Fitzsimons 
 
Abstract:  Purpose 
This paper presents an analysis of the nature and determinants of corruption, using 
recent data to clarify the nature of the corruption phenomenon and answer the 
question whether corruption can categorically be said to be a problem requiring 
public sector reform, or a consequence of it. 
 
Design / methodology / approach 
The paper analyses data on corruption in relation to the timing of introduction of 
public sector reform in recent economic transitions, and examines the persistence of 
increased corruption following the introduction of reforms. 
 
Findings 
The theoretical model suggests that events that negatively affect administrators in 
positions of trust create some reactive tendency towards corruption, and this is 
supported by the evidence from transition economies.  There is a significant increase 
in corruption following transitional economies’ public sector reform, and this 
demonstrates an unusual degree of persistence even after general institutional 
reforms have been completed. 
 
Research limitations / implications 
Further research could try alternative measures of corruption, instead of ‘perceptions’ 
data analysed here, and examine the strength of persistence across a larger set of 
countries to test the confounding effect of other institutional reforms in transition 
countries examined. 
 
Practical implications 
The costs of New Public Management reform programmes are broader than is 
currently suggested, and significant short- to medium- term deterioration might be 
expected in the aftermath of reform. 
 
Originality / value 
The paper provides a new approach to corruption research examining the importance 
of the corruption ‘tipping points’ of individual administrators and how these are 
significant in modelling corruption.   
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A troubled relationship:  corruption and reform of the public sector in 
development. 
 
Introduction 
Recent decades have seen ‘managerialism’ in public administration progress from a 
fad to a fundamental basis of government in many countries in the developed world.  
The ‘managerialism’ or ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) movement has a relatively 
specific and limited number of core principles and recommendations.   Hood (1995) 
defines an ‘NPM’ approach according to two factors.  The first is the belief that 
private sector management practice can be extensively and effectively transferred to 
public administration (or, conversely, the belief in the distinctive nature of public 
administration).  The second is the extent to which rules (or explicit contracts of some 
form) determine the role of public bodies and officials in order to reduce the scope for 
managerial discretion.  
 
Whilst the widespread recognition of the NPM might be thought to reflect its 
superiority to alternative approaches to public administration, it appears in fact to be 
relatively untested.  As Pollitt and Bouckaert (2000) state, ‘the international 
management movement has not needed results to fuel its onward march’ (p.132).  
This was at least in part due to its relationship with the political and economic 
changes of the time.  The 1980s saw the rise of a new type of government that aimed 
to shrink the systems of state support developed under the post-war consensus, and 
introduce more flexible ways of operating in a competitive environment.  This 
coincidental rise of political neoliberal principles and free market economics led to the 
political desire to reduce the size of the state structure and reduce the taxation 
previously raised to finance ‘extravagant’ public services.  In this sense the focus of 
governments of the time was as much on reduction in spending as it was on efficient 
use of spending.  The change in policy-making, whilst claiming benefits to public 
sector efficiency, was also motivated by ideological dissatisfaction with the nature of 
the political systems of the time.  In this sense, any poor performance in terms of 
economic benefits would still be potentially tolerable to those pushing through the 
reforms.  In particular, the New Public Management appears to have produced only 
limited savings that are hard to quantify, and definite costs to the public 
administration of many developing countries (Andrews and Shah, 2003). 
 
Given the points considered above, some distinct elements of reform can be 
identified for developing countries.  Typical Public Administration Reform elements 
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for Commonwealth countries have been identified by Kaul (1997).  Miller (2005) 
summarises these as: 
1. redefinition of the political and administrative interface:  clarify the roles 
between political policy makers and administrative policy implementers – 
‘distinguish between strategic objectives and operational processes’ (p.22); 
2. selection of appropriate reform options (from both private sector and 
international experience); 
3. raising accountability (government or donor led initiative) – ‘performance 
measurement, devolution or resource control, improving monitoring and 
evaluation techniques, clarifying incentives and aligning functions with 
strategic objectives’ (p.22); 
4. initiating public-private sector partnerships; 
5. efficiency:  ‘emphasis… placed on the public service to achieve 
developmental priorities.’ (p.22); 
6. audit of staff cost and skills; 
7. anti-corruption initiatives; 
8. change, fundamentally,  public sector values. 
(adapted from Miller, 2005, p.22) 
 
The UNDP Governance project (UNDP, 2004) has encouraged the reform of public 
sectors to pursue both political and economic/administrative aims for many years.  In 
their review of best practice in the field of public sector administration, they come to 
two strong conclusions.  Firstly, the nature of the developing economy makes a 
significant difference to the nature of appropriate policies, with a powerful and ‘over-
large’ state being a necessity rather than a burden.  In many cases it needs to 
substitute for the absent or under-developed private economy.  Secondly, the nature 
of the state is not simple, and it appears unlikely that a clear separation of duties can 
be effective, with administrators performing specific goal-oriented processes and 
politicians setting strategy.  This over-simplifies the role and character of both 
administrative and political actors in developing countries.   
 
Overall, the situation is still unclear whether the New Public Management approach 
was effective or not in helping to achieve its goals.  Moreover, it remains unclear 
what the wider impacts are on the operation of governments.  As Peters and Pierre 
(2001b) state:  ‘administrative reform has … had a profound impact on the nature of 
politics within the public sector, and especially on the relationship between civil 
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servants and their nominal political masters’ (pp.1-2).  What that impact is, exactly, 
remains unclear. 
 
This paper attempts to examine one particular aspect that constituted a weakness in 
the reforms, that of corruption and its control.  The paper takes the approach of 
examining the connections between different sets of reform and corruption using 
corruption theory and criminology theory to analyse the likely outcomes of such 
programmes.  In reviewing the evidence of ‘completed’ reform programmes executed 
in the former-socialist states in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular, it 
demonstrates the long-term changes in levels of corruption that follow economic and 
public-administrative reform programmes of the types referred to above.  In practice, 
both sets of reforms were simultaneously introduced in the process of post-socialist 
transition, and the effects of ‘standard reforms’ can therefore be considered in a way, 
although the examination of particular elements is of course not possible due to the 
simultaneity of the effects on the economic system. 
 
Theoretical approaches 
The theoretical underpinnings of the NPM approach are slim, perhaps based more 
on consensus view rather than the outcome of a long process of intellectual debate.  
The NPM approach is based on broad-stroke economic theory such as the theory of 
perfect competition and developments in public choice economics in the period 
immediately preceding its adoption.  These types of economics vary enormously in 
their realism.  They assume that competitive markets with large numbers of service 
providers and customers working together to produce bargains, are commonplace, 
which they are not, and that individuals will act rationally and selfishly to maximise 
their benefits from a given situation, which is unlikely.  On the basis of this theory, 
and on ‘principal agent’ theory regarding the nature of delegated authority in 
organisations, the NPM approach believed that incentives could be created through 
processes of separation out of dedicated administrative units from general state 
administration, and contractual structures defining service provision and rewards if 
achieved.  Whilst this appears logical, it fails to recognise the position that would 
result if oversight mechanisms failed, competition failed to operate for a range of 
reasons, or individuals acted contrary to the psychological assumptions of the model.  
In practice, these reforms are as likely to create problems as to solve them, and in 
particular the risk of disaffection and reactive failures of performance are high in the 
introduction of ‘NPM’ style initiatives.  In particular, there exists a risk of increased 
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corruption, the reduction of which is in fact one of the central aims of NPM reforms in 
developing countries. 
 
Corruption theory 
Some confusion exists between the different approaches to corruption, relating to the 
exact nature of corrupt administrators.  The question is, are they ‘bad’, or ‘mad’?  The 
relationship between the administrator that ‘chooses’ to be corrupt and the state in 
which they operate is relevant to this problem, obviously, but this is often neglected 
from some theoretical approaches.  Alternatively the relationship between the 
administrator and the ‘clients’ that they deal with may similarly be significant in the 
explanation of the corrupt act.  Many of the deviations from expected behaviour in the 
‘principal-agent’ relationship between the state and individual administrators may be 
interpreted as corruption.   
 
On the basis of much traditional political, administrative and economic theory, models 
of the state from the early 20th century often held an implicit assumption of 
benevolent, public-service motivation amongst the civil service.  Authors such as 
Weber (2003) asserted that the state’s administration constituted a form of rational-
legal system that was trusted and held authority over the public on that basis.  The 
economist Pigou (1938) believed that the state could be trusted to effectively enforce 
regulation in the public’s interest.  Such public interest theories, however, were 
increasingly questioned in the light of real-world evidence, and new models of the 
state emerged from economics and political science that instead predicted deviant 
behaviour in the form of corruption. 
 
Broadly speaking, the economic approach to corruption, which is possibly the 
dominant one, would discount relationship factors that might have encouraged 
individuals to act in a public-spirited way in favour of explanations based in the 
calculation of self-interested strategies, given the incentives which surrounded 
individual administrators.  This is clearly assuming that the administrator is ‘bad’.  
People are selfish unless incentives are created to keep them honest.  Alternatively, 
it can be assumed that individual administrators are inherently good, but are turned 
by environmental factors or group decision making into someone ‘bad’ – this is an 
explanation of ‘bad, but understandably so’.  Gorta (1998) sees this tendency in 
some of the sociologically based criminology literature as of potential value in 
combating corruption, in the case of Australian public administration following its 
implementation of the New Public Management approach.  Finally, they may be 
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categorised as ‘mad’.  This would either involve non-calculating behaviour that does 
not benefit the individual (the closest an economic approach may come to a definition 
of irrationality) such as public-interested behaviour of the sort described by Weber 
and Pigou, or it may be seen as ‘annoyance’ or loss of reason.   
 
On the margins of corruption theory there lies the related field of white-collar crime.  
Whilst this has mainly been applied to private-sector workers, its lessons may equally 
apply in public administration.  The literature on fraud uses the ‘fraud triangle’ (Figure 
1) based on Cressey’s (1953) research into the motivation of offenders to explain the 
decision to perpetrate a fraud, and this may be similarly applied to corrupt acts.  In 
Cressey’s model, the act of the crime depends on the existence of a motive, an 
opportunity (to commit crime and potentially get away with it), and ‘rationalisation’.  
Individuals who are de-motivated or hold some grievance may be tipped over from 
being honest to dishonest by the existence of this third factor, which reduces the 
reluctance to harm one’s victim.  The strength of this model is that it incorporates 
calculating and self interested elements to the decision to commit crime, but also 
incorporates a realistic mechanism that enables us to consider the psychological or 
social environment of corruption. 
 
Figure 1:  The Fraud Triangle 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Cressey’s work has highlighted how individuals are tipped over from normally honest 
behaviour (which enables them to achieve positions of trust) into dishonest behaviour 
given certain conditions.  The problem of corruption then becomes one of identifying 
such factors, and to predict the ‘tipping points’ when individuals become somehow 
disenchanted or pressurised to the extent that corrupt or criminal acts will occur. 
 
The implications of these models for public administration reform can be briefly 
sketched out if we consider the position of individual administrators and compare this 
to the ‘decision factors’ used in each of the approaches.  Firstly, the economic 
approach is quite simple to apply to the case of administrative reform, and Stiglitz 
(2002) examines just such a case from a developing country.  Faced with the 
changing administrative structures and, in particular, with the reduction in the scope 
of activity of an individual administrator in the process of ‘re-focussing’, there exists a 
strong incentive for individuals to take some benefits while the opportunity still exists, 
for example in the cases of ‘insider privatization’ in transition countries.  Stiglitz cites 
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examples of administrators used to taking small occasional bribes (minor corruption) 
from state service provision who, faced with their privatisation, decide to compensate 
themselves with one-off windfalls through acts of major corruption (p.58).  Stiglitz 
concludes that standard economic reforms such as privatization (the ultimate in 
agencification) are very unlikely to cure corruption. 
 
Similar conclusions can be reached using the Cressey model.  The ‘tipping factors’ 
that might cause honest workers to become corrupt are such things as increased 
personal financial pressure, reduced individual prestige, stress and psychological 
problems and, as in the case of Enron, excessively target driven and pressured 
management that encourages concealment of any problems.  These factors can all 
be easily found in transitional organisations, and on these grounds the NPM 
approach to restructuring is in fact likely to kick-start some corruption in otherwise 
honest officials. 
 
In both of the above examples, there would be a severe deterioration in corruption in 
a country experiencing particular types of reform (specifically relating to economic 
reform, but more generally to any reform where public administrators could derive an 
income, if inclined to do so, pre-reform).  These short-term effects would be severe, 
but shortlived on the face of it.  Experience of corruption suggests, however, that the 
growth of crime such as corruption has a ‘ratchet effect’ in which it is easier to raise 
than to lower.  The growth of corrupt practices has a range of knock-on effects in the 
economy that are likely to reinforce the tendency to corruption. 
 
Data 
Both corruption and public sector efficiency are difficult concepts to measure, at least 
in part because they are difficult to clearly and thoroughly define.  At first glance, 
governments that manage to reduce the size of state budgets may appear to be 
successful in increasing ‘efficiency’ in the sense that they reduce spending on 
services, but the search for efficiency should not be conflated with the desire to 
reduce the power or extent of the state.  Often the NPM countries appeared to do just 
this.  Data from Afonso et al. (2003) reveals how public sector performance actually 
declined in many of the key reform countries over the period between 1990 and 2000, 
using a measure of public sector performance across a range of government policy 
objectives.  True efficiency, in provision of units of services for units of spending, 
similarly deteriorated in a number of countries over the same period.  One strong 
result was that the connection between income levels and public sector performance 
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is not as significant as that between the size of the state and public sector 
performance – suggesting that it is a small state, rather than any particular 
organisational feature, that produces benefits for economies. 
 
Figure 2:  Relationship between corruption control and income levels 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Turning to the causes of corruption, a different set of factors appear to be dominant.  
Whilst many models of corruption exist, a strong and significant correlation exists 
between levels of income and corruption.  Relating this to the fraud model, higher 
income is likely to reduce the dissatisfaction of individuals and so reduce the 
potential ‘rationalisation’ of the act.  Accordingly, this can be seen as evidence 
consistent with the fraud approach.  This may then account for the distinct and 
prolonged worsening of corruption scores for transition countries for whom historical 
data exists (Figure 3, below), as the process of economic reform entails inevitably 
deflationary policies.  The idea of ‘reactive corruption’ therefore appears relatively 
appropriate, on general principles.   
 
This correlation is a partial explanation, however, of the phenomenon of corruption.  
Whilst income is a strong determinant of corruption, the evidence from non-OECD 
countries is much less conclusive showing wide variation that is not explained by 
income levels.  Is it the case, however, that a small state, such as pursued under the 
NPM, might improve corruption?  Potentially the reduced opportunities for rent-
seeking may reduce it.  Unfortunately the statistical analysis of such phenomena is 
massively complicated by the confounding effect of related variables.  We can argue 
that richer countries can afford better anti-corruption strategies; that richer individuals 
need not resort to corruption; or even that institutions such as social capital networks 
may both favour growth and discourage corruption (although this remains debatable 
on the basis of the existing literature on negative social capital).  What we can do is 
examine the trends that actually occurred and related data for the transition countries. 
 
Figure 3:  Impact of post-socialist reform on corruption scores (CPI) 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Typically, transitional states experience a ‘corruption J-curve’ effect, with a sharp and 
prolonged decline in the control of corruption over the post-transition period.  The 
persistence of the problem is particularly concerning, as it suggests that corruption is 
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resistant to the new institutions typically introduced in the process of reform.  From 
the reasoning above, this may well be due to the increasing pressure to corruption 
created by the reforms.  This characteristic behaviour, in terms of the corruption 
performance, of post-socialist reformers is potentially of significant concern for those 
considering the implementation of public administration reform.  The evidence 
suggests that corruption both deteriorates and then stagnates for a significant period, 
with many of these countries experiencing a decline for the best part of the following 
decade.   
 
Figure 4:  Control of corruption over time, ranked by size of economic decline 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
In order to examine whether the prolonged persistence of corruption is due to the 
income fluctuations experienced in transition, a final comparison is made between 
various transitional countries using World Bank data on control of corruption (Figure 
4).  In this diagram, the transition countries are first ranked on the basis of the extent 
of their recession following the implementation of reforms.  In this case it is clear that 
those suffering the smallest recessions, post transition, have a generally better 
control of corruption, although the relationship demonstrates only  a relatively poor R² 
score (0.316) suggesting a great deal of variation within the sample.  Typically, two 
types of country suffered small recessions – those with already strong economies, 
and those that ‘pulled their punches’ and implemented only half-hearted reforms.  
The less enthusiastic reformers may, therefore, experience relatively better 
performance in the control of corruption.  This relationship may also help explain 
recent work on transition economies that suggests that corruption is actually lower in 
countries with large governments, contrary to the suggestions of the NPM (see Goel 
& Budak, 2006). 
 
Conclusion 
There exists a strong relationship between the theory of corruption and public sector 
reform.  Whilst many areas of public policy proceed without necessary reference to 
corruption, the reform of the public sector appears inextricably linked to the problem 
of corruption.  Economic bases for public sector reform now emphasise the need for 
transparent governance structure, and ‘checks and balances’ that may prevent abuse 
of any individual’s position.  Reform packages will now typically recognise some 
issues of corruption - the nature of the relationship between the two concepts, 
however, is less straightforward than is normally suggested. 
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Overall, the outcome of a ‘New Public Management’ style reform programme is, on 
the basis of the evidence presented above, impossible to judge.  This stems from 
differences in the nature of the economic or political system in which reform takes 
place; the differences in social and cultural institutions; and the varying levels of 
development of necessary supporting institutions that might support the effectiveness 
of the reform programme.  It is however likely that reforms may actually create 
incentives to corruption that, unless checked, can cause significant and prolonged 
problems with corruption that may undermine the benefits of the administrative 
reform.  Whilst New Public Management appears to demonstrate only limited benefits, 
the consequential corruption appears on the basis of statistical evidence likely to 
have significant negative economic impacts.  The surprising conclusion can be 
reached that unenthusiastic reformers may in fact do just as well, or even better, in 
terms of the control of corruption as those who diligently pursue the recommended 
policies. 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Bibliography 
Afonso, A., L. Schuknecht, & V. Tanzi (2003)  ‘Public sector efficiency:  an 
international comparison,’  European Central Bank Working Paper Series 
No.242 
Andrews, M. and Shah, A. (2003)  ‘Citizen-centered governance: a new approach to 
public sector reform.’  Ch.6 in Shah, Anwar (ed.) Bringing Civility in 
Governance, Vol. 3 of Handbook on Public Sector Performance Reviews. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank.  Available at:  
http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/206961/CitizenCenteredGovernan
ceANew.pdf 
Bagby, L.M. & Franke, J. (2001)  ‘Escape from politics: philosophic foundations of 
public administration,’ Management Decision, Vol.39 No.8, pp.623-633 
Cressey, Donald R. (1953)  Other People’s Money:  a study in the social psychology 
of embezzlement.  (Glencoe:  Free Press) 
Ehrlich, I. & Lui, F.T. (1999) ‘Bureaucratic corruption and endogenous economic 
growth,’ Journal of Political Economy, 107/6 (Part 2: Symposium on the 
Economic Analysis of Social Behavior in Honor of Gary S. Becker):  S270-
S293 
Goel, R.K. & Budak, J. (2006)  ‘Corruption in transition economies:  effects of 
government size, country size and economic reforms,’  Journal of Economics 
and Finance.  Vol.30, No.2, pp.240-250. 
Gorta, A. (1998)  ‘Minimising corruption:  applying lessons from the crime prevention 
literature,’  Crime, Law and Social Change.  Vol.30, pp.67-87. 
Hood, C. (1991)  ‘ A public management for all seasons?’  Public Administration.  
Vol.68, No.1, pp.3-19. 
Hood, C. (1995)  ‘The ‘New Public Management’ in the 1980’s:  variations on a 
theme,’  Accounting, Organizations and Society.  Vol.20, No.3, pp.93-109. 
Kaufmann, D. (2004)  ‘Corruption, governance and security:  challenges for the rich 
countries and the World’  Chapter 2.1 in World Economic Forum Global 
Competitiveness Report 2004/2005.  (Geneva:  World Economic Forum) 
pp.83-102. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay & P. Zoido-Lobaton (2002) ‘Governance Matters II:  Updated 
indicators for 2000/01’  World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2772, 
February 2002.Mauro, P. (1995)  ‘Corruption and Growth,’ Quarterly Journal 
of Economics.  110/3:  681-712 
Miller, K.  (2005) Public Sector Reform:  Governance in South Africa.  (Aldershot:  
Ashgate Publishing) 
12 
 
Peters, B.G., & Pierre, J. (eds.) (2001a) Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative 
Reform (London:  Routledge)  
Peters, B.G. & Pierre, J. (2001b) ‘Civil servants and politicians:  the changing 
balance.’ Chapter 1 in Peters and Pierre (2001a) pp.1-10 
Pigou, A.C. (1938)  The Economics of Welfare.  (4th ed., London:  Macmillan) 
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2000)  Public Management Reform:  a comparative 
analysis.  (Oxford:  Oxford University Press) cited in p.4 of Minogue, M (2002)  
‘Getting the Ideas Right:  public management, corruption and development.’  
University of Manchester (mimeo) 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2002)  Globalization and its Discontents.  (London:  Penguin Books) 
Transparency International (2006)  ‘About Corruption.’  Available at: 
<http://www.transparency.ie/about_cor/default.htm> accessed 13th June 2006 
Tullock, Gordon (1989)  ‘Controlling corruption,’  Journal of Economic Literature.  
27/2:  658-659. 
UNDP (2004)  ‘Public Administration Reform:  Practice Note’ available at 
http://www.undp.org/policy/practicenotes.htm 
Weber, M. (2003)  ‘The types of legitimate domination,’ Chapter 55 in P. Bean (ed.)  
Crime.  Vol.III  (London:  Routledge) pp.145-64. 
World Bank (2004) ‘News and Broadcast:  The costs of corruption.’  Available at:  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,co...4457~pagePK:
34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html>  accessed 13th June 2006. 
 
13 
 
Figure 1:  The Fraud Triangle 
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Figure 2:  Relationship between corruption control and income levels 
 
Data sources: Kaufmann (2004); IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2006) 
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Figure 3:  Impact of post-socialist reform on corruption scores (CPI) 
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Data source:  Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 
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Figure 4:  Control of corruption over time, ranked by size of economic decline 
 
 Data sources:  Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido-Lobaton (2002) Governance Matters 
dataset; UNECE dataset. 
 
 
 
